Chapter 13
Vicksburg:
Sealing the Fate of the Confederacy
Nearly
before the first shots on Fort Sumter ended, visionary general officers of the
Union army foresaw that this would not be any ³90-day struggle,² as the
Washington bureaucrats and woefully inadequate top army brass claimed. Not only
was the very cream of the pre-war U.S. Army officer corps resigning their
commissions in order to serve their Southern home states, the level of rhetoric
coming from the near fanatical secessionist politicians insured that once
separate, it would be a long, hard climb to reconstruct the whole nation.
The
de facto leader of this visionary group was none other than USA General
Winfield Scott, the aged veteran of the War of 1812 and the Mexican War (not to
mention his less heroic involvement in the southeastern Native American
removals of the 1820s and 1830s). Despite his ill health and dated military
strategies, he insisted that not only was the nation headed for a long war, but
that the South could only be defeated by a long, grinding campaign aimed at
cutting itıs lines of supply and communication. His grand scheme, dubbed the
Anaconda Plan, called for an absolute blockade of the entire Southern coastline
by the U.S. Navy, to prevent resupply from friendly foreign countries and stop
waterborne reinforcement of the Confederate armies, followed by the capture and
use of the Mississippi from Illinois to the Gulf of Mexico, to cut the Southern
confederacy in half and allow it to die from lack of supplies.
³Old
Fuss and Feathers² Scottıs plan was seriously derided at first, as few Union
politicians or generals saw the need to do anything so drastic; the widely held
belief on both side was that one big battle would be all that was needed to
send the opposing army fleeing from the field, and the conflict instantly
resolved. The laughter stopped, however, after the shocking Union defeat at the
1st Manassas (1st Bull Run) battle in Virginia; and even as Scott was being
replaced as General-in-Chief by USA Major General George Brinton ³Little Mac²
McClellan, essential elements of the Anaconda Planı were being expanded into
the over Union strategy for the war.
Splitting
the South
The
Union strategy during the war had three parts; first, the total naval blockade
of the Southern coastline envisioned by Scott; second, and overland campaign to
capture the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia; and third, to take
control of the Mississippi RIver and all the port towns along it. USA Brigadier
General (later General-in-Chief) Ulysses Simpson Grant opened the third part of
this grand strategy in early February, 1862, with the assault on and capture of
Forts Henry and Donelson on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers in northern
Tennessee. With the way cleared towards Nashville and other points south in
Tennessee, Grant then turned west along the Ohio River towards the Mississippi,
swung around and isolated a strong Confederate garrison at Columbus, Kentucky,
and then turned inland to move towards Corinth, Mississippi. Memphis fell soon
afterward, after another short, fierce naval battle, completely opening the
northern stretches of the Mississippi to Union control.
USA
Major General John Pope successfully moved his Army of the Mississippi against
fortified Confederate positions at Island Number 10 and New Madrid on the
Mississippi, well supported by Union gunboats, and opened the northern
stretches of the great river to Union control by early April, 1862. Later that
same month USA Flag Officer (later Admiral) David Glasgow Farragut and USA
Major General Benjamin Franklin Butler captured New Orleans after a short naval
battle, opening up the southern stretches of the river. By early spring, 1862,
only Port Hudson, Louisiana, and Vicksburg, Mississippi, remained in
Confederate hands and prevented a complete Union domination of the river.
Background
to the Battle
The
Vicksburg Campaign was an unusually long and costly operation for both sides.
From the earliest assault attempts in December 1862 to the final surrender on
July 4, 1863, only the horrible siege at Petersburg, Virginia, from June 1864 to
May 1865 was longer or more destructive in lives to both soldiers and
civilians. As the best defensive ground of any port between Memphis and the
Gulf Coast, Vicksburg was an obvious target which the Union commanders wasted
little time in attacking.
Most
histories of the Vicksburg Campaign concentrate their attention on the famous
siege of the small town, which lasted from April 29 to July 4, 1863, but in
fact the battle for this critical river port started many months earlier.
Grant
had been given the task of completely clearing the Mississippi of any
Confederate threat when he assumed command of the newly formed USA Department
of Tennessee on October 16, 1862. Under his command were some 43,000 men,
reinforced to about 75,000 as the campaign wore on. Two days earlier CSA
Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemberton had assumed command of the CSA
Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, which for all practical purposes
simply meant the area immediately surrounding Vicksburg. The number of men he commanded
has been the subject of countless debates since the war; while probably
numbering in the 40,000 range, Grant claimed he faced well over 60,000, while
Pemberton himself stated he had only 28,000.
Chickasaw
Bluff
With
his victory at the Battle of Shiloh and the fall of Corinth, Mississippi
assuring his dominance over western Confederate armies, Grant immediately set
about moving against Vicksburg, which he considered one of the most vital
target in the entire western theater. He split his command into two great
columns; led by USA Major General William Tecumseh Sherman, the westernmost
column was to move south with 32,000 men on transport barges down the
Mississippi River from Memphis to directly attack Vicksburg. To keep
Confederate forces divided and unable to concentrate on the cityıs defense,
Grant personally led 40,000 men south overland along the Mississippi Central
Railroad tracks from Grand Junction, Tennessee, 35 miles west of Corinth.
Grant
moved south on November 26, 1862, slowly moving his large force through
northern Mississippi. Passing through Holly Springs and Oxford, he established
forward supply bases in both towns and left small garrisons to guard against
expected Confederate raids. His major problem during the march south was that his
supply lines back to Columbus, Kentucky, were growing longer and more
vulnerable. On December 20, just as the vanguard of Grantıs column was
approaching the small town of Granada, a 3,500 man Confederate cavalry force
under CSA General Major General Earl Van Dorn captured and destroyed his supply
base at Holly Springs. At about the same time, another cavalry force under CSA
Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest stormed through western Tennessee and
southern Kentucky, destroying more than 60 miles if the critical railroad lines
supplying the Union overland campaign. Grant was forced to call off his part of
the attack and move northwest into Memphis.
The
same day Grant lost his base at Holy Springs, Sherman and his men boarded a
naval flotilla in Memphis and cast off towards Vicksburg. The infantrymen were
loaded onto 59 transport ships and barges, escorted by seven gunboats. A
message about Grantıs defeat reached Sherman the next day, but he decided to
continue on, risking that his strong surprise assault might be enough to carry
the coming battle. On Christmas Eve the Union flotilla arrived at Millikenıs
Bend, Louisiana, just north of Vicksburg, and prepared to start disembarking
the troops.
December
24, 1862, in Vicksburg
Vicksburg
had been an island of relative calm at this point, a safe harbor from the
vicious naval battles that ranged north and south along the Mississippi. Social
life went little changed from antebellum times, with frequent parties,
cotillions and afternoon bar-b-ques, the major difference being that the men
wore Confederate gray dress uniforms instead of their civilian garb. Dr.
William Balfour and his wife Emma had prepared a grand Christmas Eve ball in
their house on Crawford Street, inviting the local garrisonıs officers to join
the society elite in n elaborate party. As the band played and couples danced,
mud-splattered CSA Private Philip Fall burst through the door searching for the
ranking officer present, CSA Major General Martin Luther Smith, carrying the
startling news that Sherman and his force were nearly upon them at that very
moment. Signaling for the band to stop playing, Smith addressed the crowd,
³This ball is at an end - the enemy are coming down the river, all
non-combatants must leave the city.² With that, Smith and his officers
immediately departed, calling out the garrison to man the defenses while still
in their dress uniforms.
Aware
that Sherman was coming from the north, area commander Pemberton (who arrived
on December 26 from his position at Grenada) placed the majority of his men in
a northeast to southwest line at the foot of the Walnut Hills on the north side
of town (nearly directly atop present-day U.S. Business Highway 61 on the north
side of the military park), facing northwest towards where Shermanıs troops
were expected to approach. He had about 25,000 men total (including
reinforcements brought in during the battle) divided into two divisions to
stand against Shermanıs four divisions with 30,000 men (some sources state 33,000).
The Confederate lines were formable, with several lines of entrenchments well
supported by artillery emplacements and fronted by a thick tangle of abatis
made of felled trees that also gave the infantry a well-cleared field of fire.
The
Assault on Chickasaw Bluff
The
Union troops disembarked starting on the late afternoon of December 26, and by
the next day were pushing inland towards Vicksburg, led by USA Colonel John F.
DeCourcyıs 3rd Brigade (3rd Division). As the blue-clad infantry advanced slowly
on the road past Mrs. Anne E. Lakeıs house, they came under heavy fire from
advance Confederate pickets posted in the nearby woods. This advance to contact
ended after a brief but heavy firefight; DeCourcy pulled his men back to camp
and the pickets retired within the Confederate line. Other probing and advance
to contact actions took place over the next two days, while Sherman tried to
figure out where was Pembertonıs weakest spot.
Finding
no part of the Confederate line was notably weaker than any other, Sherman
decided to try a massive head-on assault. At 7:30 AM on December 29, his
artillery opened a heavy fire on Pembertonıs line, answered quickly by
counter-battery fire from massed Confederate guns on the bluff above them.
About 11 AM, Union infantry officers ordered their men into line of battle; USA
Brigadier General Frank Blairıs Brigade on the left, DeCourcyıs and USA
Brigadier General John M. Thayerıs Brigades in the center and USA Brigadier
General Andrew Jackson Smith leading both the 1st and 2nd Divisionıs on the
right, all arrayed to strike the Confederate line at about the same time.
Under
heavy and accurate rifle fire as soon as they exited the woods, DeCourcyıs and
Blairıs Brigades stormed across the bayou and managed to push through the
entangling defenses and take the first line of rifle pits. Soon joined by the
4th Iowa Regiment of Thayerıs Brigade (the only one to make it across the open
fields), the Union infantrymen attempted to keep their assault moving and push
back through the layers of defensive entrenchments, but were soon stopped by
murderous rifle and artillery fire. As they started to pull back and retreat to
their encampment, CSA General Stephen Dill Lee ordered his men forward in a
counterattack. The 17th and 26th Louisiana Infantry Regiments surged forward,
overrunning the hapless Union infantry, and soon returned with their prize: 21
officers, 311 enlisted men and 4 regimental battle flags.
This
scene was repeated all down the line. Although Smithıs two divisions managed to
make it literally within spitting distance of the Confederate lines on the
right, they were not able to carry the works even after five assault attempts.
As darkness fell, the Union troops abandoned what little gains they had made
and returned to their encampments. That night, during a drenching and chilling
cold rainstorm, Sherman made plans to assault again the next day, this time
aimed at taking the artillery emplacements atop the bluff, but finally canceled
the attack after deciding that it would be too costly an attempt. Another
planned attack, this time against Confederate fortifications on nearby Snyderıs
Bluff on New Yearıs Day, was canceled when a thick fog prevented easy movement.
Late
on the afternoon of January 1, 1863, Sherman ordered his men back about the
transport ships and barges, and set sail down the Yazoo River to itıs mouth on
the Mississippi. The next day he was placed under the command of USA Major
General John A. McClernand, who decided to carry the battle away from Vicksburg
for the time being. Shermanıs report of the battle, and his failure, is a model
of terseness: ³I reached Vicksburg at the time appointed, landed, assaulted and
failed.² His failure cost the lives of 208 dead, 1005 wounded, and 563 captured
or missing. Despite the personal responsibility he seemed to take in his report
for the failed assault, in letter and his postwar memoirs, he blamed a lack of
fighting spirit in his own infantry for the failure, most notably DeCourcyıs
Brigade, which had ironically advanced the furthest into the Confederate
entrenchments. Pemberton reported a loss of 63 killed, 134 wounded and 10
missing after the battle.
Attempts
to Bypass Vicksburg
Grant
waited a few weeks building up his army before attempting to reduce Vicksburg
again. His major tactical problem, underscored by Shermanıs failure, was that
the town was built on a steep bluff footed by swamps and the Yazoo and
Mississippi Rivers, making any assault from the east, north or south a near
suicidal venture. The only approach that might possibly work is from the east,
along the spine of ridges that arced nearly 200 miles above and below the town.
This favorable approach had itıs own set of problems, most notably, how to get
his troops in position atop the eastern bluffs. To add to all these problems,
the winter rains that year had been unusually heavy, increasing the flooding
problems and widening the rivers.
Grantıs
problems can be illustrated by the near-desperate attempt he had his engineers
make, digging a 1 1/2 mile long canal across one of the peninsulas below
Vicksburg, known locally as De Soto Point, which would hopefully allow his
troop and supply ships to bypass the powerful artillery batteries and land
unmolested south of the city. Now known as Grantıs Canal, work continued
through March of 1863, when early Spring flooding destroyed some of the works
and covered the peninsula, and the Confederate defenders moved some of their
artillery batteries to cover both ends of the canal.
Meanwhile,
USA Major General James Birdseye McPherson was attempting to bring his XVII
Corps in to reinforce Grant and hit the city from the south by cutting and
blasting a passage through the labyrinth of swamps and small rivers from Lake
Providence, 75 miles north of Vicksburg, to a point in the Mississippi some 200
miles south of the city. A 400 mile long route was mapped and partially
prepared before the entire project was scrapped as unworkable.
A
third attempt to gain the eastern bluffs was mounted by blasting through a
natural levee at Yazoo Pass, 320 miles north of Vicksburg, and plotting a
waterborne route south to the city. Before they could make much progress, CSA
Major General William W. Loringıs Division rushed north to stop the Union raid.
About 90 miles north of Vicksburg, the Confederate troops hastily built an
earthwork and cotton bale post (dubbed ³Fort Pemberton²), and engaged the
onrushing Union gunboats on March 11. The Union infantry could find no way to
assault the fort in the swampy terrain, and this expedition soon turned away in
defeat. Less than a week later a fourth and last attempt to sail through the
bayous north of the city, known as Steeleıs Bayou Expedition, ended in both
defeat and the near capture of all the Union gunboats.
The
Battle of Grand Gulf
With
every attempt to bypass the Vicksburg defenses proving unsuccessful, Grant
decided to take the head-on approach. McClernand had just been placed under
Grantıs overall command, and he was ordered to have his command build a road to
move down the western bank of the Mississippi River to a forward base directly
across from the Confederate outpost at Grand Gulf, 60 miles south of Vicksburg.
Planning to try an amphibious assault under fire against the Confederate
fortifications, Grant also directed McClernand to have his gunboats and troop
transports run past the Vicksburg Mississippi River batteries and meet up with
his Army of the Tennessee at a point ironically named Hard Times. On the night
of April 16, 1863, eight gunboats and three transports set sail downriver under
the direct command of USA Commodore WIlliam David Porter, each specially
prepared to meet the expected hot Confederate fire. The port (left) side of
each ship, which would face the Confederate batteries, was piled high with
cotton and hay bales, along with small coal scows and supply barges lashed to
each side of the ships.
Just
before midnight the small flotilla approached Confederate outposts just north
of Vicksburg, which promptly raised the alarm. Artillery crews raced in to man
their guns, and within minutes a furious firefight broke out along the river.
Porter reported later that every one of his ships were hit in the exchange,
some multiple times, but stated that his own broadsides into the town could not
help but do great damage to the city, as they were firing at near point-blank
range. One sailor reported that they were so close that falling bricks from
buildings struck by the Union cannon could clearly be heard.
Despite
the heavy and accurate Confederate fire, only one transport was sunk, and the
other ships limped down to join the infantry at Hard Times. Another flotilla
ran the same gauntlet on the night of April 22, six transports towing 12 supply
barges, but this time Confederate gunners managed to sink one transport and six
of the barges.
Grant
had planned to use the transports and barges to bring 10,000 infantrymen across
the Mississippi to a landing point at Grand Gulf, at the mouth of the Big Black
RIver. Porterıs gunboats opened fire on the Confederate fortifications at Grand
Gulf on April 29, but failed to inflict any serious damage or silence their
guns after nearly six hours of continuous bombardment. To add to his problems,
return fire from Confederate gunners inflicted serious damage to the Union
gunboat fleet. Grant reconsidered his plan, and decided to move his men
downriver to a ³cooler² landing zone. The next day, in the largest amphibious
operation mounted by an American Army until World War II, Grant crossed the
river and landed at Bruinsburg with 24,000 troops and 60 cannon. After months
of campaigning, Grant at last had a toehold on the east side of the river close
to VIcksburg.
The
Battle of Port Gibson
While
Grant was crossing the river downstream, Sherman had mounted a strong
demonstration against Haineıs Bluff, while USA Colonel R H Grierson moved his
cavalry south out of Tennessee and mounted another demonstration against the
railroad lines between Meridian and Jackson, before turning south towards Baton
Rouge. Grantıs men began moving north almost as soon as they reached dry land,
aiming for the town of Port Gibson. By late in the afternoon of April 30, over
17,000 Union troops were ashore and moving out rapidly, with several thousand
more still enroute across the river..
Two
Confederate brigades had already marched south from Grand Gulf to oppose the
Union assault, CSA Brigadier General Edward D. Tracyıs and CSA Brigadier
General Martin E. Greenıs, which by nightfall were astride the Bruinsburg and
Rodney Roads directly in the path of the Union advance. Starting about midnight
the advanced skirmishers of the Union column met up with the Confederate
pickets, and a lively firefight broke out. The firing died down about 3 AM, but
picked up again with vigor about the first light of dawn (about 5:30 AM).
The
Confederate lines held well until about 10 AM, when Greenıs Brigade was pushed
back up the road about 1 1/2 miles by a heavy Union assault. There, they were
reinforced by two other brigades hastily dispatched from Grand Gulf, CSA
Brigadier General William E. Baldwinıs and CSA Brigadier General Francis M.
Cockrellıs, which helped shore up a strong line along the Rodney Road.Tracyıs
men managed to hold up well in their position on the right, despite losing
Tracy himself, killed early in the fighting. Although several vicious
counterattacks were mounted that managed some limited success, the Union
assault was simply overwhelming, and all the Confederate commanders began
retiring from the field about 5:30 PM.
The
day-long battle cost Grant 131 killed, 719 wounded and 25 missing or captured,
while the Confederate commanders reported a loss of 60 killed, 340 wounded and
387 missing or captured. Accounts vary, but the total Confederate force in the
field amounted to about 8,000, while Grant had an estimated 23,000 engaged in
the fight by late afternoon. Confused by the Union attacks towards Vicksburg
seemingly coming from all directions, Pemberton ordered Grand Gulf evacuated
and all the troops to move within the defenses of Vicksburg, instead of
confronting and attacking Grantıs bridgehead.
The
Battle of Raymond
Rather
than directly move in and seize Grand Gulf, Grant decided to move northeast and
cut the Southern Railroad lines between Jackson and Vicksburg, Pembertonıs only
remaining line of communications, supply and retreat. Similar to Shermanıs
later march through Georgia, Grant set his forces in a three-corps abreast
formation, with McClernandıs XIII Corps on the left, Shermanıs XV Corps in the
middle and McPhersonıs XVII Corps on the right. Grant planned to move nearly
directly northeast toward Jackson, then turn right and cut the rail line
somewhere east of the small settlement of Edwards. On May 7 the three corps
moved out, a total of 45,000 Union soldiers moving deep into the very heart of
the Confederacy and dangerously far from their own base of supplies.
Pemberton
guessed correctly what Grant was up to, and sent word to his garrison in
Jackson to move out and confront the Union advance, while he moved part of his
own force in Vicksburg out to strike the Union line from the west. CSA
Brigadier General John Gregg moved his 3,000 man brigade out of Jackson
promptly, arriving in Raymond on May 11 and setting up pickets along the west
and south roads into the town. For artillery support Gregg could boast a single
battery, the three guns of CSA Captain Hiram Bledsoeıs Missouri Battery.
At
dawn on May 12 Greggıs pickets sent word in that the Union vanguard was
approaching their position along the Utica Road (today known as Mississippi
Highway 18). The Confederate commander hastily deployed his men to strike what
he thought would be the right flank of a small Union force, along both the
Utica and Gallatin Roads, and placed the Missouri Battery atop a small hill
commanding the bridge crossing Fourteenmile Creek. As the first regiments of
McPhersonıs column moved into the small valley of Fourteenmile Creek, Gregg
ordered volley fire into their flank.
The
sudden burst of fire shattered the front Union ranks, and Gregg ordered his men
to keep up a hot fire. After about two hours of volleys, Gregg order up his
Tennessee and Texans in line of assault, planning to roll up the Union line and
finish up the day. As the Confederates advanced into the dry creekbed and
through the easternmost Union formations, they ran smack into the newly
reorganized division led by USA Major General John A. Logan, who was leading
his men into battle with ³the shriek of an eagle.² By 1:30 PM, with Union
regiments and brigades piling onto the field, Gregg finally realized that he
was facing a full Union corps and started ordering his units to pull back. The
battle had become a confused swirling of Union and Confederate units nearly
invisible to their commanders in the thick, choking dust, and it took most of
the rest of the afternoon for both commanders to get a complete grasp of their
own positions and issue appropriate orders.
Gregg
attempted to break contact and retreat, but McPhersonıs troops kept a running
battle going until they reached Raymond itself. The Confederates hurried past townspeople
who were preparing a victoryı picnic for them, before stopping for the night
at Snake Creek. McPhersonıs men broke off the pursuit in Raymond, where the
Union troops helped themselves to the picnic dinner. The next morning Gregg
moved his brigade back into Jackson, reporting a loss of 73 killed, 252 wounded
and 190 missing or captured. McPherson reported to Grant that he had faced a
force ³about 6,000 strong² but emerged victorious, at the cost of 68 killed,
341 wounded and 37 missing or captured.
The
Battle of Jackson
Surprised
at the strong show of force so far east of Vicksburg, Grant decided that he
would have to take Jackson before he could safely turn back west towards
³Fortress Vicksburg.² On May 13 he ordered his army forward once again,
McPherson north from Raymond along the Clinton Road, Sherman northeast through
Raymond towards Mississippi Springs, and McClernandıs Corps arrayed in a
defensive line from Raymond to Clinton, to guard against any more unpleasant
surprises. The same day, Department of Tennessee and Mississippi Commander CSA
General Joseph Eggleston Johnston arrived in Jackson by train, to assume
overall command of Vicksburgıs defense. With Grantıs army nearly knocking on
Jacksonıs door, Johnston ordered an immediate evacuation of the city towards
the north, with Greggıs Brigade and parts of two other brigades remaining as
long as possible to mount a rear-guard action. After a heavy rainfall the
morning of May 14 briefly delayed their attack, Shermanıs and McPhersonıs Corps
charged the weak Confederate defenses with bayonets fixed starting about 11 AM,
driving the Confederate defenders back after a bitter hand-to-hand struggle,
and capturing the outer defenses of the city without much loss.
Although
strong Confederate artillery emplacements delayed the Union advance in the
center, Sherman sent part of his command around the right flank and north along
the railroad line into the heart of the city. With his left flank breached,
Gregg ordered his brigades to move out of the city along the Canton Road to the
north, while Union troops invested the city right behind them. By 3 PM the
Stars and Stripes was being hoisted again over the state capital building. The
few hours of combat resulted in about 300 Union killed, wounded and missing,
and an estimated 850 Confederate casualties.
With
Grantıs army between him and Vicksburg, Johnston believed that he had arrived
to late to do any real good, but sent a series of messages to Pemberton urging
him to march out of Vicksburg and join the 6,000 troops he had moved north out
of Jackson in a great battle to destroy Grantıs force. Pemberton, a great
believer in the use of fixed fortifications, was extremely reluctant to enter a
campaign of movement and maneuver, and made it very clear that he wished to
remain in his line along the Big Black River, but finally agreed to move out.
In a clear act of disobedience of orders, instead of moving to join Johnston,
Pemberton decided on his own to strike against Grantıs line of communication
back to Grand Gulf, now occupied and a major supply center for the Union Army.
On
May 15 Pemberton initially moved his 23,000 men southeast to near Edwardıs Station, effectively
moving further away from Johnston and placing Grantıs army between the two
commands. Unknown to either Confederate commander, Grantıs men had intercepted
the series of orders and communications between them, and the Union commander
was maneuvering his own forces to exploit the confusion. Johnston issued
another order on May 16 to Pemberton to move northeast and join him, which for
some reason he decided to obey, but by this time Grant was ready to strike.
The
Battle of Champion Hill
As
Pemberton moved northeast early on the morning of May 16 along the Ratliff Road
just south of Champion Hill, his three division strung out along the road for
nearly three miles, a courier brought word that a large Union contingent was
bearing down upon him from the Jackson Road, to the northeast. Pemberton
immediately halted his march and arrayed in line of battle to protect the high
ground of Champion Hill itself, as well as the crossroads leading to Edwards
and Vicksburg. CSA Major General William Wing Loringıs Division covered the
Raymond Road to the south, the right flank of Pembertonıs line; CSA Brigadier (soon
after Major) General John S. Bowenıs Division deployed along the Ratliff Road
to Loringıs left; and CSA Major General Carter Littlepage Stevensonıs Division
covered the left flank and the crest of the small knob of Champion Hill.
Just
before noon USA Brigadier General Alvin P. Hoveyıs and Loganıs Divisions of
McPhersonıs Corps attacked along the Jackson road against Stevensonıs positions
atop Champion Hill. Stevensonıs men were soon forced off the crest under heavy
fire, but Bowenıs Division shifted north and succeeded in regaining the hill.
Grant ordered his artillery massed and directed all fire on the hilltop
Confederate positions, quickly followed by renewed infantry assaults. About 1
PM Stevensonıs and Bowenıs men were forced to retreat under the crushing Union
assault, escaping south along Bakerıs Creek to the Raymond Road before turning
west towards Vicksburg.
CSA
Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghmanıs Brigade was ordered to act as a rear guard,
to cover the escape ³at all costs.² Joined by Loringıs men, they put up a
fierce resistance but were cut off by massive artillery fire and forced to move
further south and east, eventually circling around north and meeting up with
Johnston near Jackson. Tilghman himself was killed during the rear guard action.
Pemberton
led his armyıs retreat west through Edwards before taking up a defensive
position at the Big Black River for the night, while McClernandıs Corps moving
in from the south entered and occupied Edwards about 8 PM. Grant reported
losses of 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing or captured, while
Pemberton suffered casualties amounting to 381 killed, 1,018 wounded and 2,441
missing or captured, but the real damage was the decisive defeat of the
Confederate forces. Pemberton would eventually limp back into VIcksburg minus
Loringıs Division, which never returned to his command, but Grant had succeeded
in isolating Vicksburg to an island outpost completely cut off from any hope of
resupply or reinforcement.
Big
Black RIver Bridges
Pemberton
was unaware that Loring was not following him back into Vicksburg, instead cut
off and circling around to the south and east to join up with Johnston at
Jackson. Instead of immediately moving all his forces back within Vicksburgıs
formidable defense, he ordered Bowenıs Division reinforced by CSA Brigadier
General John Vaughnıs Brigade to hold a defensive perimeter around the bridges
over the Big Black River, in the hopes that Loring would soon show up and have
a safe passage over the river. On the morning of May 17, with the rest of
Pembertonıs troops marching the 12 miles west to Vicksburg, McClernandıs XIII
Corps rapidly swept forward and engaged Bowenıs small command.
Bowen
had established a seemingly tight line of battle, well anchored on the river on
the left and a waist-deep swampy area on the right, with 18 artillery pieces
arrayed along the line to sweep a wide area of fire that any Union assault
would have to march through. Even before McClernandıs Corps was fully arrayed
for battle, USA Brigadier General Michael Lawler saw an opportunity to gain a
quick victory, and ordered his brigade to fix bayonets and hit the center of
the Confederate line. In a hand-to-hand combat that lasted less than three
minutes, Vaughnıs Brigade broke under the fierce assault and ran for the
bridges, followed quickly by the rest of Bowenıs command, as more and more
Union infantry brigades fixed bayonets and followed Lawlerıs lead.
Many
of the retreating Confederates drowned while attempting to cross the river,
forced into the water by Pembertonıs chief engineer, CSA Major Sam Lockett, who
had set fire to the bridges to keep them out of Grantıs hands. There is no
known surviving record of Confederate dead and wounded in the brief battle, but
Grant reported capturing over 1,700 prisoners and all 18 artillery pieces,
while suffering a total of 279 dead, wounded and missing out of his own
commands.
Burning
the bridges slowed Grantıs advance less than a single day. His engineer threw
up three bridges across the river by the morning of May 18, and the great Union
army quickly crossed and moved out towards Vicksburg.
Fortress
Vicksburg
Shortly
after the fall of New Orleans in the Spring of 1862, USA Flag Officer (soon
afterwards Rear Admiral) David Glasgow Farragut sailed his West Gulf Blockading
Squadron north along the Mississippi River and captured Baton Rouge and Natchez
without resistance. Joined just outside Vicksburg on July 1, 1862, by USA Flag
Officer Charles Henry Davisı Western Flotilla, sailing south along the
Mississippi after capturing Memphis and reducing the Confederate rivers fleet
to a shattered remnant, the two powerful gunboat fleets had managed to take
control of nearly the entire river for the Union after only a few months of
campaigning. Now, the only thing that stood in the way of complete and free
Union transit of the river was a few artillery batteries stationed high on a
bluff next to the river in the small but very important port town of Vicksburg.
Farragutıs
fleet had passed by Vicksburg several times, starting in late May, and had
exchanged fire with the rapidly growing city defenses to no real effect. Before
Davisı arrival, his own mortarboats and sloops had kept a steady bombardment of
the town, irregularly at first, but growing in intensity as both sides brought
more guns into action. After three weeks of numbing and near continuous fire,
and after the intense heat and disease had rended all but 800 of his 3,000
sailors unfit for duty, Farragut called off the operation and sailed south,
while Davis returned his fleet to Memphis. Farragut reported that Vicksburg
could only be successfully reduced by a combined army and naval force attacking
from land and water simultaneously.
Even
before the first Union assaults on the town, Department of the West commander
CSA General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard had prepared a plan of defense
for the town after the defeat at Shiloh, and sent engineer CSA Captain D. B.
Harris south from Fort Pillow to oversee the initial construction of a series
of fortifications. CSA Major (later Major General) Martin Luther Smith soon
arrived from constructing the defenses of New Orleans to take over building the
VIcksburg defenses, and ended up commanding troops during the siege from behind
his own line of fortifications.
In
September of 1862, following Farraguts failed attempts, this line of
fortifications was extended to the inland side of Vicksburg, neatly surrounding
the town with a powerful, near unassailable and continuous line of forts,
infantry positions and artillery emplacements. Within a few months the defense
line ran from Fort Hill on the north side of town along the curving ridges some
nine miles south to South Fort, then back north along the river for some 4 1/2
additional miles. The defensive line mounted about 115 heavy guns, with another
31 mounted in batteries alongside the river.
The
only approaches into the city through the surrounding ridges were six roads and
one railroad track that ran across natural bridges over rather steep ravines.
To guard these natural avenues of attack, Harrisı engineers had constructed
nine well constructed and powerful forts, some with walls nearly 20 feet thick.
Each one of these forts was surrounded by a maze of interconnected and
interlocking rifle pits, artillery batteries and communications trenches. In
front of this line was a deep and wide ditch and all the trees were cut down
for quite some distance in front of the line to provide a clear filed of fire,
making any direct assault a suicidal venture at best. The town was now a
massive fortified redoubt, nearly impregnable to reduction by weapons of the
day, that could either prove a safe haven for itıs Confederate defenders or a
deadly trap, depending entirely on what Grant choose to do.
First
Assaults on Vicksburg
Grant
believed he had Pembertonıs 31,000 men demoralized and not fully prepared to
make much of a fight after his two week-long running battle from Port Gibson to
the Big Black River, and wanted to storm the Vicksburg defenses before they
could recover. On May 19, with 50,000 men under his command, but only 20,000 in
position to strike, he ordered an immediate assault on the town.
Shermanıs
XV Corps was the only command in position to strike, and about 2 PM he ordered
a general attack. Moving against the northeastern corner of the Vicksburg line,
his men attempted to storm and reduce the powerful fort called Stockade Redan.
Advancing under heavy and accurate Confederate fire, part of one regiment (the
13th U.S. Infantry) got close in enough to place their colors on the exterior
sloping wall before being thrown back with heavy losses. This was the only
gainı Sherman managed before withdrawing; McPhersonıs XVII and McClernandıs
XIII Corps made some demonstrations against other parts of the line, but
neither did any better than Sherman, who lost nearly 1,000 casualties to no
gain.
Three
days later Grant ordered another assault attempt, this time preceded by a four
hour long artillery barrage against the Confederate line followed by a 45,000
man attack against a three mile front. Portions of all three corps managed to
make it to the base of the Confederate defenses, but only one regiment
penetrated the line. An Iowa regiment of McClernandıs corps led by two
sergeants shot their way into the Railroad Redoubt through a hole made by their
artillery, and in a fierce firefight managed to kill or drive out the
Confederate defenders. Before this regiment could be reinforced and the breach
in the wall exploited, men of CSA Colonel Thomas N. Waulıs Texas Legion
counterattacked and regained the fort. No other Union gain was made before the
entire assault line was once against thrown back with heavy losses.
Pemberton
had even managed to rest many of his combat troops even during these assaults,
using only about 18,000 of his men in the defense, while inflicting a total of
3,200 Union casualties. Pembertonıs own casualties in these assaults is not
recorded, but were undoubtedly much less severe than Grantıs. With his powerful
assault forces turned aside without much difficulty, Grant changed his plans
and settled in for a long siege of the fortified town, something Johnston had
already warned Pemberton would be inevitable and disastrous if he pulled his
forces back into the city as planned.
The
Siege
Grant
officially began his siege operation on May 25, and with the exception of two
isolated events, made no further attempts to take Vicksburg by force. With all
lines of supply, communications or reinforcement successfully cut, rant
directed his engineers and infantry to begin construction of a series of siege
trenches, designed to gradually grow nearer and nearer the Confederate
positions. He had no intention of simply allowing VIcksburg to starve itself
out, at least initially, but planned to try digging a series of mines (or
tunnels) under the massive fortifications, pack them full of explosives, and
literally blast his way through the walls into the city.
While
the infantry was busy digging their way through MIssissippi, Grantıs artillery
and Porterıs naval flotilla set about making life miserable within the town.
While the city had suffered sporadic shelling from Union gunboats on the river
ever since the first days of the campaign, nearly constant incoming fire began
soon after Pemberton brought his army inside the defenses, and did not cease
until the final surrender some 47 days later. It did not take long for
Vicksburgıs citizens to move out of their homes and into caves dug deep into
the sides of the hills. It also did not take long to figure out when they could
safely venture out to try and find food and water; 8 AM, noon and 8 PM, when
the artillerymen would cease firing to eat their meals. Grant continuously
built up his siege artillery force, by the end of June he had 220 guns of
various sizes engaged around the city.
Within
a relatively short time the siege made life nearly untenable for civilians and
soldiers alike within the city. Food supplies had not been abundant when the
campaign began, and when all supply routes were cut, what few items were still
available commanded premium prices. Flour sold for as high as $1,000 per
barrel, molasses for $10 per gallon, spoiled bacon for $5 a pound and what
little cornmeal remained went for $140 per bushel. Beef, coffee, sugar, bread,
and even horse or mule meat was nearly nonexistent. For a while a bread made of
ground peas was available, for a price, but soon even this disgusting fare was
gone. Some accounts even claim that the rat population of the city nearly
disappeared by the middle of June,but this is undoubtedly an apocryphal tale.
The truth, however, is just as stark; by late June the average soldier ration
consisted of one biscuit, four ounces of usually rotted bacon, peas and
sometimes a little rice each day, less than half of the normal combat ration.
One
odd shortage that reared itıs head in June was that of cartridge bags for
Pembertonıs remaining heavy guns. These bags were made of flannel and held a
measured charge of gunpowder, and not a single bolt of the cloth could be found
anywhere in town. The soldiers were being asked to give up their outer shirts
for the cause, when the ladies of the town found out and immediately volunteered
their petticoats. A newspaperman in town later remarked that every outgoing
shell from the cityıs 10-inch Columbiads was powered by these womenıs
underwear.
Sherman
Gets Impatient
Only
two days after the siege operation began, Sherman displayed his usual
impatience and requested help from Porterıs naval flotilla to reduce the
fortifications before him. The gunboat Cincinnati was reinforced with heavy logs and bales
of cotton along her ironclad sides, then moved downriver to directly confront
the river batteries below Fort Hill, clearing the way for the infantry to move
in.
The
Cincinnatiıs captain,
USA Lieutenant George M. Bache, brought her downriver on May 27 and turned
close to shore on the north end of town to prepare to open a broadside fire on
the Confederate batteries. However, before his own guns could open fire, the
swift river current caught his boat and spun it around, forcing Bache to unmask
his stern batteries in order to maintain control. This was the weakest and
least armored section of the ironclad, and the Confederate gunners took full
advantage. From atop Fort Hill and from the multiple batteries along the river,
rains of 8- and 10-inch fire raked the Union gunboat, soon smashing through her
stern and shooting away her steering gear. Within minutes the huge gunboat was
an uncontrollable mess of smashed gundecks and wounded and dying men.
Bache
attempted to run his boat aground on the far side of the river, to allow his
crew to escape safely, but the boat was too badly damaged to stay afloat that
long. The Cincinnati
went down in three fathoms of water, taking 40 of her men with her, her colors
still flying from the blasted stump of a flagpole where they had been nailed
during the brief but vicious battle.
The
Mines
From
the very start of the siege, Grant had planned to try and blast his way through
the Confederate defenses by using mines, and by late June the first were ready
to go. A tunnel had been dug under the 3rd Louisiana Redoubt, near the center
of the arcing Confederate line, and filled with over a ton of gunpowder. On
June 25 the mine was ready, and Grant ordered every gun he had to open fire all
along the Vicksburg line, to prevent Pemberton from shifting his forces around.
At 3 PM the powder was fired, and with a deafening roar the entire top of the
hill was blown off, opening a crater 50 feet in diameter and 12 feet deep. WIth
nearly 150 heavy guns and every infantry unit along the line supporting, two
regiments led by USA Brigadier General Mortimer D. Legget charged into the
breach, only to discover that the Confederates had discovered their mining
attempt and moved back to a second fortified position.
From
there, the Louisiana troops directed near point-blank volleys of shot and
cannister into the Union infantry ranks, whose survivors were then soon joined
in hand-to-hand combat by the 6th Missouri Infantry Regiment. The Illinois
infantrymen attempted to stay in the crater, throwing up a hasty was in front
of them and forming in a double line of battle to keep up a continuous volley
fire of their own. The Louisiana defenders responded by throwing hand-grenades
down into the crater, which Legget later said did fearful damage to his
surviving infantry. The firing died down after the Union infantry managed to
pull back slightly and build a parapet across the crater for their own
protection. Grant reported a loss of 30 men, but this is not thought to be accurate;
his true loss in the short action was most likely between 300 and 400 killed or
wounded. Pemberton reported a loss of 90 dead and wounded.
The
next morning Pembertonıs men exploded two mines of their own on the north side
of the line, near where Shermanıs troops were working on a mine near the
Stockade Redoubt. No-one was killed, but the Union mining operation there was
destroyed. Another mine was started that day under the new position of the 3rd
Louisiana Redan, and fired off on July 1. This time a large number of
Confederate defenders were killed or wounded in the explosion, which completely
destroyed the large redoubt and blasted a hole 50 feet wide and 20 feet deep in
the parapet walls. CSA Colonel Francis Marion Cockrell led his Missouri regiment
immediately forward to seal the breach, although himself wounded by the
explosion. Under extremely heavy artillery and rifle fire the breach was
gradually filled in and reinforced, although at a cost of over 100 infantrymen
during the six hour long operation. Grant never ordered an infantry attack
forward to exploit this breach.
With
mining operations continuing all along the Vicksburg line, Grant decided to
hold his forces in place until all was ready, then fire all at once and assault
in one huge wave over the line. By July 2 the siege trenches were so close to
the Confederate positions that the defenders would only have time for one
volley before the Union infantry would be on top of them. The only crimp in
this plan was a possible attempt to relieve Vicksburg from Grantıs rear.
Johnston
had returned to Jackson after Grantıs departure, and had spent the intervening
weeks building up his forces. In addition to the men he had pulled out of the
capital in the face of the Union assault, he now commanded Loringıs Division,
joining him after being cut off from Pemberton after the Battle of Champion
Hill, as well as every militia unit, local defense command, home guard or
individual able man that could be scraped together from all around Mississippi.
Johnston had appealed to both Bragg in Georgia and Davis in Richmond for more
troops and supplies, but the building Chickamauga campaign in north Georgia had
taken up every spare man and all the available supplies. In Jackson he had
nearly 30,000 troops, but the vast majority were ³green² troops totally
untrained and ignorant of battle, with a curious collection of shotguns,
muskets and old rifles.
Despite
the odds, Johnston was determined to do what he could, and sent a message to
Pemberton that he was on the way and would attempt to break through Grantıs
siege line, probably on July 7. Grant had intercepted this message, and
promptly shifted his forces around to face Johnston, whom he feared far more
than Pemberton, and requested immediate reinforcements from any command in the
west. Several thousand men arrived from the Trans-Mississippi Theater and from
Union armies in Tennessee by later June, and sent Sherman to take control of
the growing threat from the east.
In
the end, Johnston never did anything with the army he had raised, remaining in
Jackson until June 28, then hesitantly moving west. On July 4, still not in
contact with Shermanıs line at the Big Black RIver, he learned of Pembertonıs
surrender and immediately returned his army to Jackson.
July
4, 1863: The End
By
early July nearly half of Pembertonıs men were unfit to fight, suffering from
malaria, dysentery, gangrene and a host of other illnesses, and the rest
capable of holding on but weakened by the severe food shortage. Nearly every
building in the city had been hit by the ceaseless artillery fire, and most
were reduced to blasted hulks. Snipers fired at any man who dared poke his head
out of his trench or above the parapet of his redoubt, civilians were now
living full time in dug-out caves, many with ventilation so poor that candles
wouldnıt stay lit. The stench from blasted-apart horses and mules filled the
air, and everyone was approaching complete exhaustion from the strain of the
prolonged siege.
Pemberton
knew that Grant was about to make a move against him, and undoubtedly knew that
his men probably wouldnıt be able to stop it. Multiple communications begging
Johnston to attack went unanswered or came back with replies saying the Jackson
garrison needed more time to organize. In answer to his predicament, a letter
appeared in his headquarters on June 28, signed ³Many Soldiers,² praising his
own inspired leadership but asking that he surrender. The letter went on to
threaten a general mutiny if he did not. On July 1 Pemberton circulated a letter
among his top commanders asking if their troops would be able to fight their
way out of the siege, which came back with a decided negative answer. On July 2
he called a conference of all his officers and point-blank asked if they
thought he should surrender the city. Only two disagreed, but could offer no
other feasible plan.
At
10 AM on July 3, 1863, white flags of truce were raised all along the Vicksburg
line, and for the first time in weeks the guns fell silent. After some
difficulty in discussing the terms of surrender, with Pemberton showing some
late-stage theatrics and Grant calmly insisting upon unconditional surrender, a
deal was finally struck late in the day. Confederate soldiers would surrender
their weapons but would not enter prison camps, instead being paroled out as
soon as rolls could be made out. Grant wanted to avoid the expense and
logistical nightmare of feeding and transporting 30,000 prisoners, and
Pemberton was quite acceptable to the offer, undoubtedly knowing that most of
the men would soon return to the army anyway.
At
10 Am on July 4, 1863, the day after the great Union victory at Gettysburg,
Pemberton ordered each of his division in turn to get out of their trenches,
form up, and march under their own colors to the surrender point. Union
regiments stood alongside the road watching silently as their beaten opponents
passed, offering in a soldiers way a salute to the gallant defenders of
Vicksburg.
With
the Confederates stacking arms and tenderly laying down their colors, USA Major
General John Alexander Logan led his 3rd Division into the town to occupy it,
and soon one of his regimental flags and the Stars and Stripes were raised over
the Courthouse. The long campaign was at last over, and the end of the
Confederacy in the West had begun.
The
Cost
Both
sides suffered terribly in the long campaign to capture Vicksburg and
ultimately the Mississippi RIver. There are fairly complete records for Grantıs
losses; 1,514 killed, 7,395 wounded and 453 captured or missing. Confederate records
are very spotty on this period, but during the siege operation alone Pemberton
lost a reported 1,260 killed, 3,572 wounded and 4,227 missing or captured.
Union records indicate that a total of 29,491 surrendered on July 4, but this
figure includes all the civilians left in town as well as the remnants of the
Confederate defenders.
The
Tour
Getting
There: Vicksburg
Vicksburg
lies 45 miles due west of Jackson, Mississippi, easily accessible on Interstate
20. The battlefield park lies just off I20 exit 4, turn right at the bottom of
the exit ramp (approaching from Jackson) onto Clay Street and the well-marked
entrance to the park is just ahead on your right. The main business district of
Vicksburg is further west along Clay Street, which is dotted with directional
signs to guide you to all the prominent and most of the obscure sites and
attractions. The Vicksburg Convention & Visitors Bureau Welcome Center is
across the street on the left from the battlefield park entrance, and is a
must stopı for detailed directions, as well as the vast selection of
brochures, discount coupons, maps and other information on the local
establishments and attractions. The staff is quite friendly and has
demonstrated an outstanding willingness to go far out of their way to help meet
the visitors needs.
Chickasaw
Bayou Today
Almost
all of the Chickasaw Bayou battlefield is now private property and not open to
touring, but you can get a good view of the area from both a highway that runs
through the area, and from certain points in the battlefield park. U.S. Highway
61 Business, also known in town as Washington Street, runs northeast out of
town, and just past the boundaries of the battlefield park it passes over the
remains of the COnfederate line of defense. About 1 1/2 miles north on U.S. 61
Business is a turnoff to the left leading to an old Indian mound; this was the
position held by the 31st Louisiana and 52nd Georgia Infantry Regiments,
supported by a battery from the 1st Mississippi Light Artillery, which successfully
held off five strong assaults by Union troops.
One
of the best views of the general area can be had from Fort Hill, within the
battlefield park (stop 9 on their tour map). From the north ramparts, look
straight ahead and a bit to your right; the bluffs you can see about two miles
away are the positions of Confederate artillery during the battle, the
Confederate infantry was in emplacements at the base of the bluffs, and the
swampy are you can see a little to your left is where the Union troops assaulted
through.
Modern
Times in Vicksburg
Today,
Vicksburg is a bustling small town, driven in about equal parts by Civil War
related tourism and the new boom in riverboat gambling. As you drive down the
³main drag,² Clay Street, you canıt help but notice both the extreme frequency
of markers and monuments scattered among the fast-food restaurants and small
businesses, and that even many of the completely non-ACW related businesses
make some reference to the long siege and battle in their names; the Battlefield
Inn, Vicksburg Battle Campground, the Pemberton Square Mall and so on. Although
obviously the destination at the end of a well-worn path leading hoards of
tourists from Jackson and other points east (and west and north and south), it
is a surprisingly pleasant place to visit. Unlike a great number of other
tourist and Civil War related destinations, we did not have a single unpleasant
encounter during our visits, and aside from a few government employees in the
national park, we experienced nothing but the warmest and most gracious of
welcomes wherever we went.
This
no doubt was the result of Vicksburgıs ³other² and perhaps least obvious face;
that it is ground-zero for that most revered of all surviving Southern
traditions, the Southern belle. Scarlet OıHara in Gone With the Wind fame is the idea that most people not of
the South have of belles, and in some ways it is an accurate portrayal. Belles
are known here (and across the Old South)
as an effective combination of sugar-sweet politeness covering the
tenacity and effectiveness of a tank, who would never think of being rude to a
stranger any more than they would wear white shoes before Easter (or after
Labor Day, for that matter). While some of their traditions seem a bit dated,
such as never putting dark meat in a chicken salad or avoiding Miracle Whip
like the plague(³real² Southern belles make their own, or at least buy
Hellmanıs and add a little lemon), it is an absolute delight to be in the
presence of people who would never dream of making you feel uncomfortable or
unwelcome. As opposed to the standards set by certain television talk shows and
the average rush-hour commute, these ladies can think of no word stronger than
³tacky² to describe the worst possible aspect of someoneıs behavior. And they
would never, ever say that to their faces.
Old
times are indeed not forgotten here, as the annual Spring and Fall Pilgrimages
open the many antebellum homes for tours, the fees from which helps keep many
of them open and in the same family. Many of these homes claim rightfully to
have survived the vicious fighting here, and several have visible damage to the
structure as proof. While the main Visitors Center on Clay Street can give you
maps and brochures of the even dozen homes open year-round for tours, some of
which are listed below, a casual drive around the small city takes you past
many others that wear their scars from the War as badges of honor.
One
last word about touring Vicksburg before we recommend some specific sites and
attractions: When you go (and you must!), prepare to stay awhile and let the
charm of this Confederate mecca embrace you. This is not the sort of historic
site that treats itıs history as a sideshow to help get you to empty out your
wallet, these folks rightfully treat their town as hallowed ground, where the
sacrifices of both sides are respectfully preserved, and for the most part, tastefully
presented.
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